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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAKE CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation,
Appellant
vs.
DON CLYDE and KATE CLYDE,
his wife; LARRY F. CLYDE and
BARBARA CLYDE, his wife;
LOUIS A. KIRK and JANE KIRK,
his wife; JAMES F. CLYDE and
EARLENE CLYDE, his wife;
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE
CLYDE, his wife,
Respondents

Case No.
11148

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, appellanl
herewith replies to new matters raised in responden~ 1 :
brief.
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S ACTION TO A VOID THE
EFFECTS OF EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WAS
NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION:
Point IV of respondents' brief states that bec&usi
appellant's action was not commenced for more than four
years, the same is barred. In reply, we cite 45 Am. Jur.
470 under section 89:
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"Neither the language nor the policy of the
registry acts was intended to affect the holders of
antecedent rights, but only such persons as are
compelled to search the records in order to protect their own interests. Accordingly, the universal rule is that the record of an instrument is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and
incmnbrancers only, and does not affect prior
parties. The owner of real estate, it is said, is
w1der no obligation to watch the records to see
whether someone who does not own his property
has assumed to place a mortgage upon it or convey it by deed to some third person." (emphasis
added)
The above principles were clearly applied and the
doctrines were enunciated in the United States Supreme
Court case of ARMSTRONG v. ASHLEY, 204 US 272,
51 L.Ed. 482, 27 S.Ct. 270; and in MC CONNELL v.
DIXON, \¥yo., 233 P2 877. Also see annotation in 137
ALR 290. Also see RYAN v. PLOTH, 140 P2 968
(Wash.); KRAUSE v. MARINE TRUST & SAVINGS
BANK, Calif., 1928, 270 P. 246.
POINT II.
APPELLANT RAISED QUESTION OF TWOTHIRDS OF STOCKHOLDERS PRIOR TO
APPEAL.
A. A MUTUAL IRRIGRATION COMPANY IS A
NON-PROFIT CORPORATION. At the bottom of page
14 of respondents' brief they undertake the argument
that appellant is a corporation "for pecuniary profit."
There is not a scintilla of evidence thereof. All of the
evidence points to the fact that appellant is a non-profit,
mutual irrigation corporation and subject to the laws
incident thereto.

2
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The principal evidences thereof are the articles ol
incorporation, first as filed in 1888 under the 1884 laws
of Utah (exhibit 1), and the articles as filed in 194i
(Exhibit 2) together with the Minute book (Exhibit 6).
There is no other evidence in the record than these
three sources, and they are more than adequate to settle
the question in terms of a long line of decisions by tht
Supreme Court of Utah.
The respondents' brief at page 15 argues that "The
Articles are in t1ie format of articles of a private cor.
poration for pecuniary profit. .. " 'l'his is a clear deception. By ref erring to the Laws of 1884 cited by appellant
the only statute under which corporations could then be
formed was Chapter XL V "Of Private Corporations,"
under Section 1 thereof: "Hereafter, whenever any number of persons . . . desirous of associating . . . together
for establishing and conducting any mining, manufat
turing, commercial ... or the construction of ... irrigaf.
ing ditches ... benevolent, charitable or scientific association ... may, by complying ·with the provisions of thi1
act, become a body corporate." (Laws of Utah 1884, page
78)

In Section 22 of said act, special provision is made

for corporations named in Section 1 of the act which are
not concerned with pecuniary profit, but such "may in·
corporate themselves as provided in this act." It does
not say "shall." There are no mandatory provisions thal
distinguish profit from non-profit corporations excepi
in Section 25 where it is made mandatory that a mortgag<
or sale of the non-profit corporation property be accoDI·
3
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1

plislwd "by a two-thirds' majority vote of its members ..."
(emphasis added)
An examination of the original Articles (Exhibit 1),
ohows that the purpose for which appellant was formed
1
was "'1 0 manage, control, regulate and equitably divide
and <fo;tribute among the stockholders of the corporation
acC'ording to their respective accrued rights the waters
of Lak<> Creek ... for irrigating and domestic purposes."
(Art. llI)
In Article IV, after naming the subscribers: "The
capital stock of said corporation consists of the rights to
the w·w of water of Lake Creek ... for domestic and irrigating purposes, and the amount that each party owns
in said creek estimated in acres is indicated in the foregoing by the number of shares subscribed, each share
representing one acre of water-right. . ." (Emphasis
added)
In the Articles as adopted in 1943 (Exhibit 2), reinstating the corporation for lapse of charter, the purposes are not altered except to more completely spell
out the manner in which the full use and management
of the waters of Lake Creek would be accomplished, one
of these being the aspect of storage of water. The corporation was authorized to do all incidental things to
accomplish the "irrigation or enjoyment of the lands or
property of its stockholders... " (Article IV, 4). There
is no business contemplated except those incident to the
use of the water. Primary and secondary rights of the
stockholder-users are carefully spelled out.
Again in Article VIII "the capital stock of this corporation consists of the right to the use of the waters
4
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of Lake Creek ... " which does not sound like a mercan.
tile corporation engaged in buying, selling ordinary com.
modi ties for profit!
In Article IX "The officers and directors of this
corporation shall perform the duties of their office sim~
lar to those perfarmed by officers and directors of irr~
gation corporations similar to this corporation." (Em.
phasis added)
In Article XV "The Board of directors shall have
power to mak~' by-laws for the management of said company, the regulation of its officers, the control of its
property for the benefit of its stockholders," provided
"that such by-laws and rules are approved by a majority
of its stockholders ... " These provisions clearly make the
directors trustees for the benefit of the water-users, and
is clearly consonant with the doctrines of this court as
laid down in the several opinions in SMITHFIELD
WEST BENCH IRR. CO. v. UNION CENTRAL LIFE
... 1943, 142 P2 866, 105 U. 468, where in the Larson
opinion it is stated:
"The waters of a mutual irrigation company
belong to the users, the company being merely a ·
distributing and apportioning trustee. . . . The ·
water controlled by it may be used by any share· ·
holders, subject only to the regulation thereof by
the company for the benefit of the shareholden
so none shall be deprived of his rights by the
others. The company cannot sell any of the water I
without the consent of the stockholders . ... Like- i
wise the company cannot permit the water to be
lost by non-use thereof as long as any shareholder
desires to and is in a position to use the water.
Water undistributed may be used by any stock5
1
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holder in a position to use it. The shareholders
are in effect owners in common of the waters
with certain limitations as between one another
governing the use thereof. Each may therefor use
any water not being used by any other shareholdPr, as is the case ·with other owners in common ... "
BAIRD v. UPPER CANAL IRR. CO., 257 P.
1060, 70 u. 57
FOWLER v. PROVO BENCH CANAL, 101 P2
375, 99 U. 2G7, 1940
BIG COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH v. KAY,
157 P2 795, ____ U. ____ 1945
In GENOLA TOvVN v. SANTAQUIN CITY, 80 P2
930, 96 U. 88, this court said:
"Stock in a mutual company entails the right
to demand such stockholder's aliquot share of the
water in proportion as his stock holding bears to
all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a mutual company for convenience of operation and
more efficient distribution and perhaps for more
convenient transfer. But the stock certificate is
not like the stock certificate in a company operated for profit. It is really a certificate showing
an imdividPd part ownership in a certain water
.rnpply. It embraces the right to all for such undivided part according to the method of distribution." (Emphasis added)
GREEN DITCH WATER CO. v. MONSON, 116
P2 387, 100 U. 466, 1941
BURTENSHAW v. BOUNTIFUL IRR., 90 U.
196, 61 P.2d 312, 1936
Re: JOHNSON ESTATE, 64 U. 114, 228 P. 748,
1924
In GREEN DITCH v. MONSON, supra, this court
said in a case determining that a mutual irrigation company was not subject to franchise tax:

6
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. "If. its :evenue was confined to money re.
ce1ved from its stockholders in proportion to their
interest, it could have no profits and it would con.
duct no business from which the state sought t-0
exact a license tax.... From their very nature,
mutual irrigation companies differ from other pri.
vate corporations, and yet they cannot well orga.
nize as an eleemosynary entity. It is evident that
the legislature in 1909 sought to exempt from the
license tax such canal and irrigation companies
as confined their activities to providing water for
their owr memberships, regardless of the general
language used in the articles."
In coming to the above conclusion, the court was
impressed with the allegation that the sole source of
revenue to the mutual corporation "has been born by
assessments duly levied against its members ... that
said corporation has been throughout its existence, a
non-profit corporation, and that said corporation was not
organized for pecuniary profit. .. "
In terms of the above, let us examine Exhibit 6,
the minute book of appellant, dating back to 1934 to the
present, as the best evidence of record of just how the
company carried on its business.
All income for the company was acquired by assess·
ments, either of money or its equivalent in labor.

The following pages in Exhibit 6, the minute book,
are evidence of this: 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, 27,
29, 31, 33, 37, 40, 44, 47, 49, 52, 55, 58, 59, 61, 71, 78, 81,
86, 90, 92, 95, 99, 101, 113, 120 and 123.
In the last entry in Exhibit 6, the minutes record:
"President Clyde Ritchie reported of the directors' meet
ing held Sat., January 21, 1967, stating that a $1,000.00
7
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note would come due in July. In this meeting the directors decided that some of them might pay part of their
full assessment, to pay the note off without borrowing
more money." ( P. 123)
The reading of the entire minutes defies any operations of the appellant except as a mutual, non-profit
eorporation.
The 1884 law under which appellant was organized,
and whieh is quoted on page 15 of respondents' brief,
required "a two-thirds majority vote of its members ... "
to sell or mortgage the property. Section 16-6-9 now
requires the same two-thirds vote.
Even the preamble to the Agreement (Exhibit 7),
prepared by attorney Hatch declared appellant to be "a
mutual irrigation corporation."
B. THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE WAS RAISED
DURING THE TRIAL:
On page 14 of respondent's brief in the middle paragraph, the respondent falsely states that the issue of
the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders was necessary to bind a mutual irrigation company, was first
raised in the appellant's brief.
On page 8 of appellant's brief reference is made
to "J R 30" meaning the Judgment Roll. Please advert
thereto to number 1 of the Motion to Amend Findings, etc.
which states: "1. To insert a finding of fact which will
read "That Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation and a
mutual irrigation company." The corrollary of this is
found on page 31 of the JR in number 10 as follows:
"Insert a Conclusion of Law to read "That the directors
of the plaintiff do not have authority to convey the assets

8
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of the corporation but snch authority must be granted
by a two-thirds vote of the stockholders at a meeting
called for such a purpose>." After argument before tht
court, the contentions of appellant were erroneously overruled. (J. R. 40) Clearly the matter was well before the
trial court.
POINT III.
1
EYIDI~NCE \V A8 RECEIVED AS TO WHO
\VERE THE S1'0CKHOLDERS AND THAT
TWO l~XPRESS Ml~ETINGS \VERE HELD
CONCERNING THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF
THE PRESIDENT.
On page 14 of respondents' brief in the middle paragraph thereof, it is stated "No evidence was offered as
to who the stockholders were or whether or not they ever
held a meeting concerning the transfer."
Respondents mislead the court. On page 18 of the
transcript, the president identified Exhibit 6 as the minute book. On page 122 the minute book was received in
evidence. On page 106 of Exhibit 6 near the bottom
the first reference is made to the subject of the litigation; and after said annual meeting of the stockholders,
the Board of Directors had an important meeting con·
cerning fishing rights at which it was learned that the
president had denied to Russell Wall that he had ever
executed a deed!
On page 121 of the minute book, Exhibit 6, the
names of stockholders owning 413 shares are set forth,
together with the results of a vote taken at a special
meeting of the company stockholders for the express
purpose of acting on the recommendation of the board
9
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of directors to "set aside that certain Quit Claim Deed
dated :March 1, 1959 and that certain agreement dated
March 1, 1959 giving to the Clydes the fishing rights in
Witts Lake and Deer Valley and other items."
POINT IV.
'L'Ill~ 'l'HIAL COUHT ERRED IN DECLARIN(; THAT EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WERE AND
ARI!: VALIDLY EXECU'l'ED:
In point III respondents have treated numerous subjects. We deem it necessary to challenge and reply to
certain of them, but only on the theory, which we deny,
that the board of directors of a mutual irrigation company could convey assets without consent of the stockholders.
On page 12 of their brief, respondents admit that
the directors did not know the terms of the alleged agreement. "Their professed ignorance of the acts of its president and secretary in signing an agreement does not
relieve the corporation from liability ... " And again:
"... their asserted collective failure to inquire ... " In
E'inding number 7, reproduced at page 6 of respondents'
brief, the court erred in finding that directors Holmes
and Anderson "personally participated in performance
under the agreement and had knowledge that an agreement of settlement of many matters" had been reached,
etc. We argue that in law there was no ratification.
I

I

' I
' '

I

A. RATIFICATION: On page 13 of respondents'
brief ratification by the board is claimed. Neither the
facts nor the law warrant such a conclusion.
By the respondents' citation at 19 Am. Jur. 2, 660
it is mandatory that the corporation "repudiate the trans-

10
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action" after "it has learned of an unauthorized act."
Two things are implicit in the cited authority. l) the
corporation must know specifically of the unauthorized
act; and 2) it must act to repudiate at once. In this case
the board of directors did not know of the unauthorized
act; and when the directors learned thereof, they were
disturbed. (Tr. 48) They acted at once to repudiate the
president's act.

IN McCONNELL v. DIXON, Wyo., 233 P2 877, it
is stated: "A party alleging, asserting, or relying on a
ratific2tion of the unauthorized act of an agent has the
burden of proving it." It is respondents who have the
burden and they have not sustained it to any degree.
In this connection, let it be remembered that in sustaining
such burden, the Wyoming case held that it must he
proven "that the principal intended to ratify," and "to
constitute ratification" the principal "must have full
knowledge at the time of ratification of all material facts 1
and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act or i
transaction. Note further what the Wyoming court said .
under "Ratification":
1
I

1

"The principal, where nothing has occurred
to put him on guard, is not bound to distrust his
agent; he has the right to assume that the agent
will not exceed his authority; - and he is not
obliged before accepting the benefits of an un·
authorized act, to inquire whether, in performi~g
it the agent has not in some way violated !us
t:Ust. Mere careless ignorance or mere negligence
in not discovering the departure from authority,
where there is nothing to suggest it, is not enough.
Neither is the principal to be charged with mere
11
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c.onstructive notice. He is not, for example, obhged to search the public records for evidence of
his agent's fault and he is not charged because
such records would disclose that the agent was
performing unauthorized acts." Furthermore,
acquiescence without knowledge of the material
facts is not sufficient . ... The principal must have
fidl knowledge of the imauthorized act of his agent
and an opportunity to repudiate the same before
any delay in repudiating the act in question can
constitute a ratification thereof."
Defendants-respondents have predicated most of their
defense of the decision of the lower court on the existence
of "an agreement" between the parties that would dispose of all of the controversy. Counsel for the Clyde
interests totally ignores the first and more important
agreement between the parties and by a practiced obfuscation has undertaken to concentrate all attention on
the second so-called agreement, exhibit 7, thus creating
the strongest type of ambiguity as to ratification.
It is imperative that the first "agreement" be adverted to; it appears only in the minutes of the plaintiff
corporation on page 74 thereof. (Ex. 6) At no time
was the existence of said agreement ever disputed. Don
Clyde testified there was such an original verbal agreement. (Tr. 198) One of the defendants, Bob Clyde, was
present at a board of directors meeting of appellant in
1956 and the "right-of-way discussed. . . . Bob Clyde
stated if a fence would be built on one side of the ditch,
and a water trough put in and a bridge across the
cement ditch, this would be all they would ask for a
right-of-way through their ground." At no time do the
respondents ever make any denial in this case of that

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

understanding and agreement. 'l1hey try to cast all
attention to an attempted formalization of that earlier
agreement three years later, exhibit 7, wluch is thP
one never known of or approved by the board of direc
tors, but of which the unfair, misleading and deceptiv~
language is employed in the brief of respondents to show
some form of ratification as follows:
" ... at lt•ast fonr of the five directors nevertheless personally participated in performance of
obligations under the agreement with knowledge
that settlement of many matters of controversy
with the defendants had been made. They, lik~
wise, knew of the existence of an agreement o)
some sort and that they were performing under
an agreement."
The above quoted language from page 11 of respondents' brief creates a mis-impression. The court must find
which agreement the said directors participated in performing. Counsel refers us to the pages of the transcript
for the answer, and it is clear that three of the four
directors had no knowledge of exhibit 7. They all had
full knowledge of the one appearing at page 74 of their
minute book, exhibit 6. As we examine their testimony,
be it remembered there were five directors constituting '
the board. Director Bond was never in Glen Hatch's •
office concerning this business and exhibit 7 never came
to his attention. (Tr. 211) The other director was the
president, Clyde Ritchie. While he testified he did no!
read what he signed on exhibit 7, he alone can be charged
with knowledge of what it contained. (Tr. 49) Now
note what the other three had to say about the two agree·
ments:

13
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HARVEY CROOK, a director, objected on page 74
to the "broad territory" taken in by asking questions
about an agreement. He testified he did not "ascertain
the exact terms of that agreement." (Tr. 74) He refused
to state said agreement was after lambs had been lost.

(74)

Crook knew there was some dispute about the loss
of lambs but the work that was done was not exclusively
done in settlement of such dispute. (Tr. 75) He stated
that "There was work done every season up there to some
extent." (Tr. 75) After Crook knew there was a problem of the loss of lambs (which would be in 1959) he
testified that he did no more work on fencing; after that
he moved away, ceased to be a director. (Tr. 76, 77) Director Crook did not ever know that his corporation had
paid Glen Hatch for the legal work as claimed in the
brief. (Tr. 78) In this connection, let it be remembered
Glen Hatch had served as counsel for the irrigation company for "several years" and the board was in the habit
of paying Glen Hatch. (Tr. 18, 19) The president was
irritated that Glen Hatch now represented the Clydes.
(Tr. 134)
On re-direct, Crook clarified, stating he was aware
of an agreement "as to certain places on the reservoir
that might be washing and that should be taken care of
in this matter .... I was not aware of any written agreement." (Tr. 80) Maintenance work was constantly going
on by the directors and there was "no difference" between
such maintenance and the work connected with the socalled agreement. (Tr. 81)

14
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That is the summation of the Harvey Crook testi.
mony . By no stretch of logic or language could this or
the lower court enter a finding that such agreement being
testified to was anything but the one recorded in th1
minutes at page 74.
GEORGE HOLMES: This director also did wor!
on the fencing, but "We were putting the fence up for
the right-of-way for the ditch." (Tr. 103) Notice how
careful he is on page 103-104 of the use of the wora
"agreement." The fence work he was doing was "to pa~
for the right-of-way." (Tr. 104) Further, may the court
be conscious of how careful the witness is to relate hi>
work to fencing, spillway repair, but it is counsel for
the Clydes that twists the inferences beyond the intent
of the witness, as shown on page 105. At this time, when
he is testifying to work accomplished there was no "dis·
pute about fishing in this period." (Tr. 105) The extent
of the talk was to get the date of opening changed. (Tr.
106) This language by George Holmes cannot be twiste<l
into knowledge or ratification of exhibit 7 or the dee~.
KENNETH ANDERSON: This director, along wit~
the two just ref erred to, had never seen the agreement,
exhibit 7, until just prior to bringing the law suit (Tr.
110, 69, 71, 98) and there had been no discussion by tb
board of said agreement. (Tr. 111) There had been di~
cussions concerning fencing, repairs. The ditch wll!
cemented in 1956 and 1957. (Tr. 111) He and his boyi
had fished for ten years. (Tr. 112)
While he was aware there were problems of sheei
being drowned, he stated he was aware that some "under
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1

standing had been reached with the Clydes and Lake
Creek . . . concerning those matters which included the
fencing of the ditch," but "I didn't know of any agreement." (Tr. 113) While Anderson acknowledged there
had been a compromise with the Clydes, the exact terms
thereof as argued in the brief were not ever in his mind.
(Tr. 116) He participated in the fencing, and knew there
were difficulties with the Clydes, but now see the revelatory answer on cross examination by Bullock of this
director:
"As I recall, the fence was approved and was
done. When we talked with Bob (Clyde) he agreed
if we built the fence, he would give us an e,asement
for a right-of-way for the cement ditch.
Q. That is why you were building a fence?
A. That is right." (Tr. 117)
Bullock trapped Anderson into false statement at
the top of page 118 which was later clarified on re-direct:
"I want to know if you were aware of any agreement
in 1959 to do anything? A. No." (Tr. 118) It is clear
the verbal agreement he was testifying to was with Bob
Clyde and occurred as early as 1956, and is shown at
page 74 of the minute book, exhibit 6. (Tr. 119) Appellant's counsel asked Anderson what agreement concerned
the work that was being done and the witness shows at
page 119 and 120 of the transcript that it was pursuant
to the minute at page 74, not to exhibit 7. It was so
clear the witness knew of no agreement in 1959 that the
court sustained an objection by Bullock on repetition,

and there the testimony of the director Anderson closed.
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Now as to these three directors, none of whom eve
saw or heard of exhibit 7 or 8 until just before the sui:
their testimony of agreement clearly concerns the on
shown at page 78 of their minute book. "Some sort" u
agreement, as stated on page ll of respondents' bri:
must never be tortured into exhibit 7, but is clearly r:
ferring to page 74 of the minute book and the day-to-da
operations of the irrigation system.
In connection with language appearing at page;.
of the minute book "It was stated that a contract\.
drawn up and to be signed by the land owners." Exhih
7 was probably drawn in answer to said minute, but.
was done three years later; and by that time, seven
new ingredients had been grafted into the concept~
settlement as conceived by the Clydes and their attorne:
There can be no doubt but that later several additiont
elements than appeared on page 74 of the minutes wer
in the minds of the Clydes and their attorney, and po'
sibly these entered the mind of the president of the irr
gation company, but such elements never came to tl
attention of directors Cook, Holmes, Anderson nor Boni
As we have argued, there can be no ratification in tl
absence of full knowledge of the terms and conditiot
being ratified.
None of these directors had a hint that property1
the mutual company was being conveyed. Cert.am
these directors were doing maintenance work every yea:
some of which would naturally come up in discussio1
with their neighbors, the Clydes relative to washing 1
the spill-way, fences and water ways that had been I
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fore discussed. It is likely that these three directors
believed their president had had minor understandings
concerning the day-to-day operations of the reservoir
and the cement ditch, but this is a far cry from an
agreement to convey and deliver water down the Mills
ditch, and to give up the company rights to fishing!
rrhese were rights that vested in the members, the water
users, and were not subject to conveyance as in a mercantile corporation.
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Even the preamble to exhibit 7, the alleged agreement, prepared by defendants' attorney, recites that
Lake CreBk Irrigation Company is "a mutual irrigation
corporation of the State of Utah." The attempted usurpation of power by the president to bind the water users
is in language in two places in exhibit 7 that require the
diversion of storage water down the Mills Ditch. Paragraph 3 contains this requirement so as "to water their
stock (meaning the Clydes) in the area through which
the Mills Ditch passes." Then again in paragraph (5),
the mutual company covenants with the Clydes "to draw
sufficient water from the Deer Valley Reservoir to reach
the Mills Reservoir and to conduct the same by ditch to
the Mills Reservoir during the high water period in the
spring and in the autumn. Note Don Clyde admitting
the appellant company at no time ever honored that
language in exhibit 7 and had refused to turn waters into
the Mills Ditch. (Tr. 196, 187)
The reason for the two-thirds vote being required of
non-profit corporations in the Utah statute is here in
clear view. Neither the president, nor the directors of a
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mutual irrigation company would have the right to convey the waters of the stockholders without the latter's
vote. There must be preserved the sanctity of water
rights in the water user, as distinguished from the right
of a board of directors to do the common, day-to-day
maintenance 01Jerations to keep the system operating.
It would make good law to permit the board to control
ordinary mainten[lnce and to make agreements concerning same; but it is another story, and the invasion of
vested rights to permit the conveyance of water into the
Mills ditch and reservoir, or to deed away the rights of
fishing and fish culture, absent the knowledge and vote
of the shareholders. The naked act of the president and
the secretary who was not even a member of the board,
could not accomplish what even the directors would have
no authority to accomplish in a mutual irrigation company.

1

B. REPUDIATION ACCOMPLISHED AT ONCE.
It is clear from the minute book, exhibit 6, that onee
the mutual company learned of the contract and deed,
the board acted quickly to test the same, asking for and
receiving a vote of the entire stockholders to repudiate
the same.
Let it be remembered that the sole maker of the deed
denied he had executed the same when confronted by
stockholder Wall just before this action was filed. (Exhibit 6 page 107, Tr. 124) The minutes of a directors'
meeting held January 18, 1965 show that "Russell Wall
reported to the board on the assignment he had been
given in July, 1964 to secure a private pond fishing per- l
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mit for the Witt Reservoir. He reported he had made
application to the ... Fish & Game Commission for a
private pond fishing permit in Jnly and that . . . " in
this connection the Fish and Game office had reported
that "Boh Cl~-de had been to their office and indicated
that the Clydes had a deed to this property for the fishing rights. Mr. Wall assured Mr. Ware that this was
not the case; that he, Mr. vVall, had been authorized by
the board of directors . . . to secure the permit, and
the Irrigation Co. was the owner of the land and fishing
rights . . . . Mr. Wall also stated that ... he went to
President Ritchie and President Ritchie said there was
no such deed to his knowledge. Then Mr. Wall reported
that he went to the court house to check this and found
a quit claim deed to Don Clyde for the title to this property. Mr. vVall presented a photo copy of the deed to
the board and the board indicated that the legality of the
deed should be checked since there had been no resolution
given for this transaction in the minutes of the company.
The meeting was recessed and the Annual Stockholders
meeting was held... " (Exhibit 6, page 107, 108)
The minutes of the stockholders meeting held on the
same day state: "The fishing rights were discussed.
Authorization was given to the board to preserve the
fishing rights for the company. (Exhibit 6, page 106)
The following page references to minute book relate to
the board's actions re. fishing rights. 109, 110, 111, 113,
114, 119. In several of said minutes it appears the board
negotiated with the Clydes; but as no compromise could
be reached 344 shares voted at a special stockholders'

'
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meeting (Ex. 6, p. 121) instructing the board to bring
court action to set aside the contract and the deed. Only
69 shares voted against.
Let it be well remembered that prior to the time the
board of directors knew of the alleged agreement and
deed, it had authorized Russell vVall to purchase 2000
fish and plant them in Witt Reservoir, and he did so,
purchasing the fish from private sources. (Tr. 128) Also
about .July 10, 1964 the Witt Lake area was posted to
private fishing showing that the company acted at that
early date as though no deed had been executed. (Ex. 9,
Tr. 126) In this connection, Wall was in the act of
applying for a private pond permit when he first learned
of the alleged deed to the Clydes. (Tr. 128, 129; Exhibit
6, page 107) Numerous of the shareholders fished on the
Witt. (Tr. 125, 88) Director Anderson fished "two years
ago" which would be in 1964 or 1965. (Tr. 112) Had they
known of the deed or agreement it is not likely they would
have so fished.
Also it should be born in mind that the company
never put water into the Mills Ditch as per the alleged
agreement. Don Clyde testified to this at page 187 and
196 of the transcript.
In these above matters, the mutual irrigation company had acted as though there was no agreement, and
when informed, repudiated it quickly.
Thus, in terms of the authority cited in the American Jurisprudence quote on page 13 of respondents'
brief, the mutual company repudiated the unauthorized
act of its president "within a reasonable time of receiving information of the unauthorized transaction."
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C. APPARENT AUTHORITY: The citation on

page 12 of respondents' brief of 19 Am. Jur. 2d 591 and
the case following are not in point. The appellant corporation at no time held Clyde Ritchie, its president, out
to the public or to the respondents as having authority
to bind the irrigation company. This is clear from exhibit
12 where attorney Glen Hatch requested specifically the
resolution of the board of directors concerning the signing of exhibits 7 and 8. Glen Hatch as attorney earlier
for the appellant, and now for the respondents, clearly
knew the limitations of the president.
The American Jurisprudence citations in respondents' brief are entirely beside the point. No authority
can be inferred in President Ritchie; and in law, the
execution of the agreement and deed were never known
to the directors until just before the litigation to contest
the same was filed. Nothing in the record suggests the
corporation or the board of directors had permitted the
president to "exercise the whole power of the corporation." Every bit of evidence points to the board making
the decisions. (Tr. 48, 78, 80, 97, 108) The minute book
is full of proof to this effect. The only time the president was known to act arbitrarily and without consultation with the board is the one being litigated. The
following page references to the minute book, exhibit 6,
will show how the board functioned historically. 74, 77,
84,85, 86, 87, 89, 90,92,95, 98, 99, 100,101, 102, 104, 105,
106, to the end.
The cited case of HANOVER NATIONAL BANK v.
AMERICAN DRY DOCK on page 12 of respondents'
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